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1. INTRODUCTION
Foreign investors have become very concerned with the current ec-
onomic and political climate in Brazil.' The failure of the Cruzado
Plan in 19862 drained Brazil's foreign exchange reserves and prompted
a moratorium on repayment of $67 billion owed to foreign commercial
* Joint M.B.A./M.A. candidate, 1988, Lauder Institute of Management and In-
ternational Studies of the Wharton School of Business, and Graduate School of Arts
and Sciences of the University of Pennsylvania; B.A., 1986, Howard University. The
author was employed during the summer of 1987 in the Sio Paulo, Brazil branch of
Citicorp Investment Bank.
1 See Suzuki, Credores Japoneses Temem Prejuizo corn a Moratbria [Japanese
Creditors Fear Losses from the Moratorium], Folha de S~o Paulo [hereinafter
FOLHA], July 19, 1987, at A39, col. 1; Bancos Estrangeiros se Procupam Sobre o
Constituinte [Foreign Banks Are Worried About the Constitution], FOLHA, June 5,
1987, at A27; see also Special Report: How U.S. Banks View Their Brazilian Loans,
Brazil Watch, Sept. 7/21, 1987, at 4, 5 (stating that Brazil's smaller creditors have lost
patience with attempts to solve Brazil's debt crisis and would prefer to sell their loans
outright).
I Brazilian President Jos6 Sarney introduced the Cruzado Economic Stabilization
Plan on March 1, 1986 in an effort to control Brazil's rampant inflation. The plan
operated by: (1) replacing Brazil's previous unit of currency, the cruzeiro, with a new
one, the cruzado, (2) eliminating previous price indexation by freezing all wages and
prices, (3) imposing a fixed exchange rate between the Brazilian cruzado and the
United States dollar and (4) proposing decreases in government spending. Riding, Bra-
zil Freezes Wages and Prices in Sweeping Anti-Inflation Drive, N.Y. Times, Mar. 1,
1986, at Al, col. 4. Imposition of the plan caused dramatically increased levels of con-
sumption in Brazil, shortages of goods and pressure to raise prices. Instead of slowly
unfreezing prices in June or July of 1986 as originally planned, President Sarney suc-
cumbed to political expediency and delayed lifting the price freeze until just after the
nationwide elections held on November 15, 1986. Riding, Protests Engulf Brazil Presi-
dent, N.Y. Times, Nov. 29, 1986, at Al, col. 5.
As a result, hyperinflation returned, and the Brazilian business community suf-
fered a dramatic loss of confidence in its government. Both the original Cruzado Plan
and its successor, the Cruzado Plan II, are generally regarded as failures. See Brazil
Back to Square One with Price Adjustments and Return to Indexation, Bus. LAT.
AM., Feb. 9, 1987, at 41; Riding, Big Price Increases Shock Brazilians, N.Y. Times,
Jan. 2, 1987, at Dl, col. 3; Brazil's Cruzado II Disappoints, Rundt's Weekly Intelli-
gence, Nov. 20, 1986, at 13.
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banks.' The merits of debt-to-equity exchanges as an appropriate solu-
tion have been actively debated in the Brazilian Press.4 Nonetheless,
Brazil's Central Bank, (Banco Central do Brasil), has yet to make pro-
visions for converting debt to equity. 5 Investors also await Brazil's pro-
posed new constitution. The Congress to Establish a New Constitution
(Constituent Assembly) is not expected to present a new constitution
until well into 1988.6 In the constitutional debate, politicians of both
the center and of the left have proposed severe restrictions on foreign
investment.7 Such proposals ignore Brazil's need for foreign investment
in both the present and the future.
This paper has four objectives: (1) to review current Brazilian law
on foreign investment, especially with respect to financial issues such as
debt-to-equity exchanges, capital repatriation and profit remittance, (2)
to comment on the Brazilian legal system in practice, (3) to summarize
the arguments presented in the constitutional debate with respect to
foreign capital, and (4) to suggest some changes that may be mutually
beneficial to Brazil and its foreign investors.
s Riding, Brazil to Suspend Interest Payments to Foreign Banks, N.Y. Times,
Feb. 21, 1987, at Al, col. 1. On July 2, 1987, Brazil also suspended $1.05 billion in
payments of principal due on its $14 billion government-to-government debt with the
Paris Club. The Paris Club's Turn, Gazeta Mercantil [G.M.] (int'l weekly ed.), July
6, 1987, at 3; Brazil Freezes Some of Its Debt, N.Y. Times, July 2, 1987, at D3, col. 4.
1 See, e.g., Camargo, Troca da Divida por Acbes Preocupa [Debt-for-Equity Ex-
changes Are Worrisome], G.M., July 14, 1987, at 1; As Vantagens da Conversao [The
Advantages of Conversion], G.M., July 3, 1987, at 19.
1 The Banco Central do Brazil [hereinafter Central Bank] recently proposed a
plan to allow the conversion of up to $1.5 billion annually of Brazil's foreign debt to
equity. The plan would grant priority to certain industry sectors (such as export-ori-
ented projects, high-technology projects and tourism) and would continue existing gov-
ernmental preferences for certain geographic regions (such as Brazil's northeast).
Truell, Brazil Sets Up a Plan to Swap Debt for Equity, Wall St. J., Nov. 18, 1987, at
29, col. 1.
6 The Congress to Establish a New Constitution [hereinafter Constituent Assem-
bly] was elected on November 15, 1986 and will address many areas in addition to
foreign investment as it drafts a new constitution. Riding, Brazil, in Transition, Votes
for Congress, N.Y. Times, Nov. 16, 1986, at A3, col. 4. For accounts of Brazil's politi-
cal situation as it approaches a new constitution, see Cohen, Disillusionment Grows in
Brazil After Return To Civilian Control, Wall St. J., Nov. 18, 1987, at 1, col. 1;
Cohen, Brazil's Ruling Party Headed for Breakup, Wall St. J., July 21, 1987, at 28,
col. 1.
' See, e.g., Mundim, Conversao sem Converg9ncia: Os Nacionalistas Ameacam a
Troca da Divida por Capital de Risco [Conversion Without Agreement: Nationalists
Fear Conversion of Debt to Equity], 0 SENHOR, July 21, 1987, at 46; Camargo, supra
note 4; &onomistas Rejeitam Conversao da Divida em, Capital [Economists Reject
Debt-Equity Exchanges], FOLHA, June 11, 1987, at A33, col. 1; Ourique, Economista
Critica Conversao da Divida em Investimento [Economist Criticizes Conversion of
Debt to Equity], FOLHA, May 25, 1987, at A9, col. 1.
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2. COMPARISON OF DEBT AND EQUITY INVESTMENT IN BRAZIL
2.1. Historical Background
In the past, it made sense for foreigners to loan to Brazilian com-
panies rather than to invest in equity. Debt offered these advantages:
(1) the return was a fixed amount, (2) Brazil's nonresident withholding
tax could be shifted to the Brazilian borrower,8 (3) payment of interest
abroad on registered loans did not require prior government authoriza-
tion9 and (4) lenders often accepted conversion to equity whereas stock-
holders were seldom willing to trade their equity stake for debt. ° Until
1985, the Brazilian authorities also provided a forty percent rebate on
the withholding tax for interest payments abroad.1 Furthermore, it
was thought that "the repatriation of capital tend[ed] to be more diffi-
cult than that of loans and [would] be subject to a temporary govern-
ment embargo if serious balance of payments problems [would]
arise.""
Now, however, debt's advantages over equity have been reduced.
One analyst recently stated that "[w]ithin the context of the morato-
rium, political negotiations and crises in debtor nations, the expecta-
tions of receiving profits are much greater than the expectations of re-
ceiving interest."" Brazil's creditors are anxious to exchange debt for
equity,"' while both private and public sector firms in Brazil thirst for
' Brazilian Income Tax Reg., Decree Law No. 1.598, art. 16 (Dec. 26, 1977);
see also T. ARAOJO, INVESTMENTS IN BRAZIL: BAsIc LEGAL ASPECTS 18-19 (6th ed.
1987). This frequently updated treatise presents information on all aspects of the Bra-
zilian legal system of concern to foreign investors. It is prepared by a member of the
Sao Paulo, Brazil law firm of Ara6jo & Policastro and published by Brazil's Instituto
de Desenvolvimento Industrial de Minas Gerais [Institute of Industrial Development of
the State of Minas Gerais].
9 T. ARAOJO, supra note 8, at 18-19.
10 Foreign loans must be registered with the Central Bank in order for the lender
to remit interest payments abroad. Law No. 4.131, art. 3 (Sept. 3, 1962). The Central
Bank affords separate regulatory treatment to: (1) loans made directly between foreign
lenders and Brazilian borrowers, (2) loans made through Brazilian financial institu-
tions acting as intermediaries and (3) loans primarily intended for import financing.
See Rosenn, Regulation of Foreign Investment in Brazil: A Critical Analysis, 15 LAW.
AM. 307, 318-21 (1983). In all cases, regulation is aimed at curbing inflation, assuring
that interest rates are reasonable and requiring that capital remain in Brazil for a
minimum amount of time. Id.; see also T. ARAOJO, supra note 8, at 44-47.
" On July 1, 1985, this rebate was reduced to zero percent. Central Bank Reso-
lution No. 1033 (July 1, 1985).
12 T. ARAOJO, supra note 8, at 19.
Schwartz, Conversao Es& nas Alternativas de Negociacao da Divida [Conver-
sion is One of the Alternatives in Debt Negotiations], FOLHA, July 19, 1987, at A41,
col. 1.
1" See, e.g., Truell, supra note 5; Sotero, As Metas do Citicorp, [Citicorp's Goals],
G.M., June 1, 1987, at 30; Cunha Anuncia Intencao de Elevar Volume de Conversao
da Divida [Bank of Montreal Announces Its Desire to Convert Debt], G.M., May 27,
19881
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foreign capital.' However, since July 1984, the Brazilian Government
has imposed severe restrictions on debt-to-equity conversions. Usually,
debt can be converted only if. (1) the original creditor acquires equity
in the original debtor, (2) the exchange is approved by the Central
Bank, (3) the investment remains in Brazil until the debt's maturity
date, (4) the exchange is performed by financial institutions and (5)
ownership of a Brazilian enterprise is not transferred to a third party.
16
Even with these restrictions some deals have been finalized." The Cen-
tral Bank is now considering a new debt-to-equity program at the time
of this writing.
1 8
2.2. Brazilian Reservations Regarding Debt-to-Equity Exchanges
On July 11, 1987 the Constituent Assembly overwhelmingly ap-
proved a motion that would impose a constitutional ban on conversion
of any foreign debt into equity. 9 This motion reflected fears on the
part of many Brazilian politicians and economists that exchanges would
lead to a series of problems: inflation, denationalization of the economy,
a balance of payment's deficit, disincentives for new foreign investment
and overspeculation in the capital markets. Additionally, some com-
mentators argue that Brazil actually has a long-term balance of trade
surplus that will enable the country to pay interest and grow simulta-
neously. 0 A Group of Thirty report cautions that debt-to-equity ex-
changes would create a legal loophole permitting foreign firms to remit
profits that would otherwise be required to remain in Brazil .
2
1987, at 21.
15 See, e.g., Ourique, Empresa Defende a Conversao de Divida Externa em Acoes
na Bolsa [Firm Defends the Conversion of Debt into Equity on the Stock Market],
FOLNA, June 6, 1987, at A28; D6ria, 0 Turismo na Expectativa da Conversao da
Divida [Tourism Awaits Debt-Equity Exchanges], G.M., May 25, 1987, at 4 (President
of Brazil's National Tourist Agency arguing that equity resulting from exchanges
should be invested in tourism industry).
6 Central Bank Resolution No. 1125 (Nov. 11, 1984); see Mendes, Conversao de
Divida Externa em Investimento [Conversion of External Debt to Equity], Estado do
Sio Paulo, June 6, 1987, at 26, 2.5. (Antonio Mendes, partner in the Pinheiro Neto
law firm of Sao Paulo, discussing parameters for debt-equity exchanges in Brazil).
1 See Debt for Elebra Swap, G.M. (int'l weekly ed.), Sept. 7, 1987, at 5, col. 1
(describing first debt-to-equity conversion finalized by Brazil's largest foreign commer-
cial bank creditor, Citicorp); Mendes, supra note 16, at 26, 1.3 (describing an ex-
change performed by the Bank of Scotland and Norwest Minneapolis Bank).
18 See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
" Resolution No. 496, Diirio Oficial [D.O.], July 11, 1987; see Swaps Outlawed,
G.M., (int'l weekly ed.), July 20, 1987, at 4, col. 2.
2" See Truell, supra note 5; Sotero, supra note 14.
2' See Camargo, supra note 4. The Group of Thirty is an independent, nonprofit
organization headquartered in London and New York City that undertakes studies on
international economic and financial issues.
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Most Brazilian businessmen, however, believe that debt-to-equity
exchanges are an excellent idea."2 Although such exchanges are not a
complete solution to the debt crisis," their potential drawbacks could be
overcome by proper governmental regulation. More specifically, infla-
tion could be avoided by gradually phasing the converted debt into the
economy.24 Denationalization of Brazilian industry is also an un-
founded fear. Under existing law the stock resulting from debt-to-eq-
uity exchanges would be preferred stock without voting rights;2 5 control
of the companies, therefore, would remain with the original owners.
Allowing conversion from debt to equity need not cause more capi-
tal flight than is already occurring. 6 The Central Bank will probably
require that equity resulting from conversion of debt principal remain
in Brazil for fourteen years, and that equity resulting from conversion
of accrued interest remain for eight years.2 ' If debt were converted into
equity, remittance of profit would occur only if the Brazilian economy
achieved prosperity, whereas remittance of interest on debt would occur
regardless of swings in the economy.28 Although there is no guarantee
that profit remittance will be less than interest remittance, most foreign
investors in Brazil have chosen to reinvest their earnings in Brazil. 9
Doing so increases the registered capital base upon which future remit-
tances are calculated.30 Conversion of debt into equity is, therefore, un-
22 See supra note 14.
" See French, Swapping Debt -Just Hot Air?, EUROMONEY, May 1987, at 115.
24 For discussions of proposals to impose monthly limits on new money entering
the Brazilian economy, see A Divida na Onda da Conversao: 0 Governo Estuda a
Regulamentacao dos Swaps [The Debt on the Brink of Conversion: The Government
Studies the Regulation of Exchanges], Exame, June 10, 1987, at 26; Brasilpar
Defende "Acao Efetiva" para Atrair Capital Estrangeiro [Brazilpar Defends "Effec-
tive Action" to Attract Foreign Capital], G.M., June 6, 1987, at 19. For a description
of similar limits on conversion imposed by Chile, see Marton, The Debate over Debt-
for-Equity Swaps, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Feb. 1987, at 116.
2 See Freire, Contribuicao Jur7idica a Conversao da Divida [Legal Contribution
to Debt Conversion], FOLHA, June 9, 1987, at A22.
26 Capital flight is already at high levels. See Franco, Continua Elevado o Volume
de Remessas de Lucros ao Exterior [Foreign Profit Remittance Continues at High
Levels], G.M., July 31, 1987, at 3 (estimating that remittance of profits and dividends
abroad will amount to $1.4 billion in 1987, as contrasted with $1.23 billion in 1986
and $1.05 billion in 1985).
27 See Debt to Equity Conversion, Brazil Watch, Oct. 19/Nov. 2, 1987, at 12.
2 See As Vantagens da Conversao [The Advantages of Conversion], G.M., July
3, 1987, at 19.
2 During the last 10 years, the average annual level of dividends remitted abroad
was less than five percent of the amount of registered foreign investment in Brazil. T.
Ara6jo, Seminar on the Brazilian Economy 24 (Nov. 1986) (unpublished manuscript
available from the law firm of Ara6jo & Policastro, Sao Paulo, Brazil).
" Executive Act No. 55.762, arts. 10-12 (Feb. 17, 1965). This Act creates regula-
tions applying Law No. 4.131 (Sept. 3, 1962) as amended by Law No. 4.390 (Aug. 29,
1964).
1988]
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likely to cause a worsening of Brazil's balance of payments position.
Instead of operating as a disincentive for new money, a liberal
debt-to-equity program would attract new foreign investment. Most in-
vestors believe in the long-term future of Brazil's economy despite the
current crisis."1 In order to guarantee additional capital for Brazil, na-
tionalists wish to impose a mandatory "new money requirement" on
foreign investors seeking to exchange debt. Such a requirement would
force an investor to supply an additional dollar of fresh capital for
every dollar of debt exchanged. 2 This proposal would, however, reduce
the benefits which accrue to investors and borrowers from the debt's
secondary market discount.33
Some critics fear that converting debt to equity through the stock
market would create speculation and add to market instability and un-
certainty.3 4 Eduardo Azevedo, President of the Sao Paulo stock ex-
change, takes a contrary position to the effect that the creation of addi-
tional equity would benefit the stock market. He believes that portfolios
should be established for companies who want to reduce their debt ex-
posure by investing directly in Brazilian companies. To reduce any de-
stabilizing effects of the new money in the market, Azevedo believes
that new equity investments should remain in the country for at least
ten years. He states, "[c]apital cannot enter and then flee the coun-
try."3 5 Converting debt into equity would inject much needed capital
into the Brazilian market. Brazil's current stock market capitalization
amounts to only sixteen perent of its gross domestic product, compared
to comparable statistics of over fifty percent for the United States and
"i Investimento no Brasil Ainda Atraente, Afirma Pesquisa [Poll Confirms
That Investment in Brazil is Still Attractive], FOLHA, June 12, 1987, at A31.
11 Economistas Rejeitam Conversao da Divida em Capital [Economists Reject
Debt-Equity Exchanges], FOLHA, June 11, 1987, at A33, col. 1.
"' A simple example will show how this secondary market discount offers advan-
tages to be shared by lenders and borrowers. If a foreign investor originally loaned
$1.00 to a Brazilian company, his loan is now worth only about $.50 on the secondary
market. A debt-to-equity exchange based on the $1.00 face value offers a potential $.50
gain; this gain amounts to 50% of the original $1.00 investment. In negotiating their
exchange, the foreign creditor and Brazilian debtor will bargain as to how much of this
gain each will receive.
If, however, the borrower were required to put up an equal amount of new
money, his total investment would be $2.00. The potential gain of $.50 would then
represent only 25% of this investment. This smaller percentage of profit would reduce
the advantage available to the parties and lessen the chances that they would arrive at a
mutually acceptable transaction.
4 See supra note 7.
15 Carvalho, Ganho de U.S. $2 Bilhaes por Ano [Profit of U.S. $2 Billion Annu-
ally], G.M., July 9, 1987, at 16. Azevedo also argues that all sectors of the Brazilian
economy should be open to investment and that more than 200 public sector companies
should be privatized. Id.
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Malaysia. 6
In addition, no restrictions should be imposed on which entities
may take part in exchanges. More participants will increase liquidity
in the debt market and lower the secondary market discount of Brazil-
ian obligations.
v
3. PARTICIPATION OF FOREIGN CAPITAL IN THE BRAZILIAN EQ-
UITY MARKET
Currently, investment of foreign capital in the Brazilian equity
market must be conducted through Central Bank approved investment
companies. 8 Foreign capital is negotiated in Sao Paulo and managed
in special "1401 mutual funds," named after their regulating statute,
Decree Law No. 1.401." At the time of this writing, seven such funds
existed with a total capitalization of about $21 million.' In order to
make foreign investment in the Brazilian stock market more attractive,
remittances abroad of capital gains have been free from both corporate
and supplementary taxes. 1 The Central Bank does, however, impose
restrictions: foreign capital must remain in Brazil for at least ninety
days,' not more than ten percent of the portfolio can be invested in any
single corporation and total investments in shares cannot exceed five
percent of the voting capital or twenty percent of the total capital of
any single company.' All Brazilian mutual funds are subject to very
similar ownership restrictions.'4
Recently, the Brazilian securities regulating agency, Comissao de
" Growth with Equity, ECONOMIST, July 11, 1987, at 15. This article makes
three significant points regarding the potential advantages of debt-to-equity exchanges
for the Brazilian economy: First, if Brazil matched Chile's record in facilitating ex-
changes, the principal amount of Brazil's $110 billion external debt would be decreased
by $16.5 billion, and annual interest payments would be decreased by $1.5 billion.
Second, if the ratio between the capitalization of Brazil's stock market and Brazil's
gross domestic product were as large as the ratio in Malaysia, Brazil would possess an
additional $90 billion of equity capital, an amount almost equal to Brazil's entire for-
eign debt. Third, if Brazil allowed foreign investors to provide 20% of that extra invest-
ment, they would bring $18 billion of fresh capital into Brazil. Id. at 16.
37 Id.
38 Interview with Pedro Paulo Longuini, Capital Market Specialist, Citicorp In-
vestment Bank, in Sio Paulo, Brazil (Aug. 10, 1987) [hereinafter Pedro Longuini
Interview].
" Decree Law No. 1.401 (May 7, 1975) (as modified by Decree Law No. 1.986
(Dec. 28, 1982)). For a brief summary of important provisions of these laws, see PRICE
WATERHOUSE, DOING BUSINESS IN BRAZIL 89-90 (1986).
40 Boletin Diirio de Informac5es, July 30, 1987, at Fl.
4, Decree Law No. 1.401, art. 38 (May 7, 1975).
42 Id. art. 30.
43 Id. art. 45.
44 Pedro Longuini Interview, supra note 38.
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Valores Mobiliarios (CVM), published rules for the Brazil Fund, a
new fund to be traded in New York.45 The Brazil Fund will have ini-
tial capital of $100 million with a fixed number of shares. 6 In contrast
to 1401 mutual funds, this initial capital will not be able to leave Brazil
for ten to twenty years.47 There will, however, be secondary market
trading in New York, where profits can be realized immediately. 48 The
CVM has also recently published rules for a third option for foreign
capital: the Investment Fund - Foreign Capital.4 9 This fund will pos-
sess the advantage over 1401 funds that its shares will be traded
abroad.5" The CVM recently approved funds of this type for Banco
Bozano, Chase Manhattan Bank and Unibanco.51 Through the Brazil
Fund and the Investment Fund - Foreign Capital, the CVM's Presi-
dent, Luiz Octavio da Motta Veiga, hopes to inject $300 million into
the Brazilian stock market.52
Although the rules governing mutual funds are becoming less
stringent, foreign investors want to invest directly in the Brazilian capi-
tal market.5 s To encourage the return of flight capital, the Brazilian
authorities should accelerate the process of establishing direct foreign
investment in the stock market. Decree Law No. 1.401 was a first step,
the Brazil Fund a second, and the Investment Fund - Foreign Capital
a good third. Direct foreign participation in the Brazilian stock market
would be an excellent fourth step towards liberalization.
" Love Thy Country Fund, ECONOMIST, July 18, 1987, at 81; Magalhies,
Fundo Brasil: CVM Define Normas para Administracao [Brazil Fund: CVM Defines
Norms for Administration], G.M., June 27, 1987, at 24, col. 1.
48 Magalhies, supra note 45.
'7 Pedro Longuini Interview, supra note 38.
48 As Perspectives Que se Abrem corn o Fundo Brasil [The Perspectives That
Open with the Brazil Fund], G.M., July 21, 1987, at 4, col. 1; Magalh~es, Fundo
Brasil no Boston [Brazil Fund Goes to First Boston], G.M., July 20, 1987, at 20. The
First Boston Corporation will lead manage this fund during its first year of operation.
Id.
"I Central Bank Resolution No. 1224 (Jan. 6, 1987).
80 Id.
51 $300 Million by 1988, G.M. (int'l weekly ed.), Aug. 31, 1987, at 12, col. 2.
52 Id.
53 James Walker, Director of Yamaichi Murray Johnstone, Ltd., an association of
Japanese and Scottish institutional investors, recently stated that he would like to invest
£1 million directly in Brazilian blue chip firms over the next four years. Magalh~es,
Estrangeiros Querem Investir Diretamente nas Bolsas Brasileiras [Foreigners Want to
Invest Directly in Brazilian Financial Markets], G.M., May 12, 1987, at 18. Murray
Johnstone entered a 1401 mutual fund in 1975, but left in 1986 at the first signs of
weakening of the Cruzado Plan. Id.
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4. OBSTACLES TO RETURN OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT FROM BRAZIL
4.1. Repatriation of Capital
Although equity investments are currently more economically at-
tractive than they were in the past, capital repatriation may present
problems. After registering an investment with the Central Bank, a for-
eign investor will receive a certificate of registration for the investment's
value in foreign currency.54 If the investment is later sold, the foreign
party will be able to repatriate untaxed the cumulative amount of the
registered capital certificates.55 If the investment's book value at the
time of repatriation is less than the certificate's amount, then the for-
eign investor will be allowed to repatriate only the book value without
taxation."8 Problems arise when the Central Bank examines the firm's
books and disagrees with the investor's valuation. The Central Bank
will often demand rigorous documentation of the firm's value.57 These
additional unwritten regulations can severely delay the repatriation
process. 58 If the foreign investment has a new net worth greater than
the value of its registered capital base, the gain will be subject to Bra-
zil's twenty-five percent nonresident withholding tax. 9
4.2. Remittance of Dividends
Dividend remittance tends to be more straightforward than capital
repatriation. All dividends are freely remittable, subject to Brazil's
Law No. 4.131, art. 3 (Sept. 3, 1962).
55 Law No. 4.390 (Aug. 29, 1964) (as modified by Decree No. 55.762 (Feb. 17,
1965)).
56 Interview with Wlademir Lisso, Partner, law firm of Arafijo & Policastro, in
Sao Paulo, Brazil (Aug. 10, 1987) [hereinafter Wlademir Lisso Interview] (Mr. Lisso
stating that an appraisal of a company's worth from a well-known accounting firm can
reduce obstacles to tax-free repatriation of capital and that most foreign firms have
been satisfied with Brazil's foreign capital repatriation procedures); Interview with
Jos6 Luis Leite Doles, Attorney, Citicorp Investment Bank, in Sao Paulo, Brazil (July
20, 1987) [hereinafter Jos6 Luis Interview].
57 French, Brazil's Profit Remittance Law: Reconciling Goals in Foreign Invest-
ments, 14 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 319, 413 (1982). In some instances, the Central
Bank requires a balance sheet for the past year, in other instances, for the past three
years. Id.
1s Id. at 413-14. Even when repatriation is allowed, the value is often much less
than the foreign party would like. Jos6 Luis Interview, supra note 56.
"' Income Tax Regulations, Decree No. 85,450, art. 555 (Dec. 4, 1980).
Remittances of gains in excess of 12% of the registered capital base are also subject
to a supplementary tax at graduated rates. Law No. 4.131, art. 43 (Sept. 3, 1962).
Remittances between 12% and 15% of registered capital are taxed at a rate of 40%,
those at levels between 15% and 25% are taxed at a rate of 50% and those at levels over
50% are taxed at a rate of 60%. Id.
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twenty-five percent withholding tax imposed on the entire remittance 0
and to a steep supplementary tax imposed on any part of the remit-
tance exceeding twelve percent of the registered capital base.6" In prac-
tice, this twelve-percent limit is seldom a problem, because it is calcu-
lated over a three-year period.
62
4.3. Payment of Technical Fees Abroad
Foreign investors find it much harder to remit patent royalties
than dividends abroad. Initial establishment of a valid patent with the
Brazilian Patent Office, Instituto Nacional de Propriedade Industrial
(INPI), is a difficult process that can easily require eight years,63 and
the patent's lifetime of ten to fifteen years is calculated from the time of
first filing.6 4 Between filing and approval, the holder can neither remit
fees abroad nor sue third parties for infringement. Final approval will,
however, allow remittance of accrued fees.65 Both the INPI and the
Central Bank must approve any remittance of fees abroad.66 Remit-
60 Income Tax Regulations, Decree No. 85,450, art. 555 (Dec. 4, 1980).
6 Law No. 4.131, art. 43 (Sept. 3, 1962); see supra note 59.
According to Brazil's Minister of Economics, Luiz Carlos Bresser, Law No. 4.131
originally contained two loopholes that allowed foreign investors to repatriate dividends
without proper payment of tax. First, some investors with accrued profits were able to
pay dividends and treat them as repatriation of capital. Second, the withholding tax
was collected not when a dividend was paid, but rather at the generally later time when
it was repatriated abroad. This practice allowed investors to lessen their tax obligations
by the inflationary fall in value of Brazil's currency that occurred between dividend
payment and repatriation.
The Finance Ministry's Resolution No. 217 of July 7, 1987 closed both loopholes.
Dividends are now treated as paid from any existing profits rather than from capital,
and taxes become due upon distribution of dividends. Prado, Mais Rigor na Remessa
de Lucros [More Rigor in Profit Remittance], G.M., July 10, 1987, at 1.
62 Law No. 4.131, art. 43 (Sept. 3, 1962).
The 12% limit also tends to make economic sense as long as inflation outside Bra-
zil is low. It has been argued that the limit should be allowed to float in accordance
with bank interest rates to avoid imposing an inflationary penalty on investors.
Stroeter, Trench & Veirano, AACCLA Questionnaire on Investment 19 (Sept. 1984)
(unpublished manuscript available from the Citicorp Legal Library, Sao Paulo, Bra-
zil). A counterargument contends that, because the limit has been stable since 1964,
foreign investors should be expected to include the relation between it and world infla-
tion as a factor in their business decisions. Interview with Fabio Barbosa, Controller
and Chief of Staff, Sao Paulo Branch of Citicorp Investment Bank, in Sao Paulo, Bra-
zil (Aug. 4, 1987) [hereinafter Fabio Barbosa Interview].
6 See T. ARAfJJO, supra note 8, at 24; Rosenn, supra note 10, at 323 (stating
that the Brazilian Patent Office "processes patent applications with the speed of a tired
tortoise").
Industrial Property Code [IPC] § 24 (Dec. 31, 1971).
63 See T. ARAtJO, supra note 8, at 24.
66 Departamento de Fiscalizago e Registro de Capital Estrangeiro do Banco Cen-
tro [FIRCE] Communique No. 19 (Dec. 16, 1972). For a more detailed discussion, see
Rowland, Foreign Investment in Brazil: A Reconciliation of Perspectives, 14 J. INT'L
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tances are limited to five percent of net sales in Brazil,6 and branches
or controlled subsidiaries of a foreign parent cannot remit fees to that
parent.68
Unlike the case with patents, royalties paid by a Brazilian licensee
for use of a foreign trademark may not exceed one percent of net
sales.69 If a foreign applicant fails to file his trademark within a "pe-
riod of priority" of six months, the trademark falls into the public do-
main to be granted to the first applicant.
7 0
4.4. Use of the Joint Venture Arrangement
In order to facilitate payment of fees abroad, a foreign investor can
elect to undertake a joint venture with a Brazilian partner.7' As a mi-
nority partner, a foreign investor can contribute technology to the ven-
ture and receive payments from the Brazilian partner via the Central
Bank. Because these remittances are not considered repatriated divi-
dends or profits, only the regular twenty-five percent nonresident with-
holding tax applies .7  Brazil also encourages joint ventures with minor-
ity foreign ownership by providing subsidized financing, tax incentives
L. & ECON. 39, 52 (1979).
"' Law No. 4.131, art. 12 (Sept. 3, 1962). The Brazilian Government may ad-
ministratively impose different percentage limits on specific technology areas. See
Rosenn, supra note 10, at 321-28.
" Law No. 4.131, art. 14 (Sept. 3, 1962).
Brazilian law generally defines a firm as a foreign-controlled subsidiary if the
majority of its voting shares are owned by foreign residents. Law No. 4.728, § 4
(1965). Other definitions exist, however, for special purposes. See, e.g., Law No. 7.232,
art. 12 (1984) (restrictive definition of what consititutes Brazilian control of firms in
informatics industry).
Firms controlled by Brazilian nationals receive special tax advantages and other
legal preferences denied to firms controlled by foreigners. The proper definition of what
constitutes a Brazilian national firm has, therefore, become a topic of heated debate
both in the Constituent Assembly and in the Brazilian press. See, e.g., Greenlees, As
Definicaes Econ5micas do Partido para a Constituinte [The Party's Economic Defini-
tions for the Constitution], G.M., July 21, 1987, at 5; Greenlees, Abertura ao Capital
Estrangeiro, uma Tese que Produz Conflitos [The Opening for Foreign Capital, an
Idea That Produces Conflicts], G.M., June 5, 1987, at 5.
" Instituto Nacional de Properiedade Industrial, Normative Act No. 15, 3.2.1
(Sept. 11, 1975); Finance Ministry Resolution No. 436 (Dec. 30, 1958); see T.
ARAfJJO, supra note 8, at 29.
7" IPC §§ 17, 30. Brazilian trademark doctrine has another peculiarity that may
injure unwary foreign investors. An established user who fails to register his trademark
in Brazil possesses (contrary to the rule in most other countries) no rights against a
competitor who makes first registration. See T. Aratijo, supra note 29, at 15.
" See generally Rowland, supra note 66, at 51-62 (giving overview of the joint
venture arrangement's advantages in dealing with Brazilian legal obstacles to foreign
investment).
71 Id. at 53; Jos6 Luis Interview, supra note 56; see supra notes 59-60 and ac-
companying text.
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and permission to operate in geographic and industrial sectors reserved
for national companies.7 In addition, legislation passed in 1976 signifi-
cantly increases the legal protection available to minority
shareholders.'
Since 1964, minority ownership in joint ventures has been the only
means by which foreign banks may do business in Brazil." In practice,
the Central Bank has authorized such participation only in investment
banks.7 ' Those foreign-based institutions, such as Citicorp, which es-
tablished a substantial presence in Brazil prior to 1964 continue to en-
joy a comparative advantage over later entrants.7
5. PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF BRAZILIAN LAW
Although Brazil's foreign investment laws have been more stable
and less restrictive than those of other Latin American countries,7 " un-
certainty over which laws are actually in force creates difficulties and
uncertainties for investors. Each new piece of legislation generally in-
cludes an article declaring that "all laws inconsistent with this law are
hereby revoked." 9  In fact, investors employ the services of
"despachantes," who are official red tape cutters who specialize in bu-
reaucracy and paper exchange.80 Professor Keith Rosenn of the Uni-
7 See Rowland, supra note 66, at 51-62.
7" The Corporation Law, Law No. 6.404 (Dec. 15, 1976). This law affords sub-
stantial protection to the rights of minority shareholders. These rights include the fol-
lowing: (1) the right to receive compulsory dividends at a rate equal to at least a certain
percentage of the firm's annual net profits, id. art. 202; (2) the right to minority repre-
sentation on the firm's administrative council under certain circumstances, id. art. 141;
(3) the right to call a shareholders meeting, id. art. 123; and (4) the right of minority
shareholders to withdraw and be compensated for the value of their shares if the firm
changes its capital structure or participates in a merger. Id. arts. 45, 137, 221, 230,
252, 256, 264, 298. See T. ARAOJO, supra note 8, at 51-61; Rosenn, supra note 10, at
346; Rowland, supra note 66, at 55-56.
78 Law No. 4.595, art. 10, § 2 (1964). In addition, if the country in which a
foreign bank is headquartered imposes restrictions upon the operations of Brazilian
banks, that foreign bank's permissible ownership of any Brazilian financial institution
is further restricted to no more than 30% of voting stock. Law No. 4.131, art. 51 (Sept.
3, 1962); see T. ARAOJO, supra note 8, at 14-15.
7' T. ARAfiJO, supra note 8, at 15.
7 See House, How Citi Coins it in Brazil, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, March
1986, at 219. Of the foreign banks which entered Brazil before 1964, Citibank has the
largest presence with a dozen branches. Id. at 220. Since that time, other foreign banks
have encountered difficulty gaining a foothold in Brazil. For example, in 1985 Fernao
Bracher, then President of the Central Bank, denied a bid made by American Express
for Brazil's struggling Maisonnave Bank because the proposed shareholders' agreement
included an administrative contract giving American Express executive control. Id.
78 See T. ARAfJO, supra note 8, at 13-14.
" Rosenn, Trends in Brazilian Regulation of Business, 13 LAW. AM. 169
(1981).
80 Id. at 180.
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versity of Miami Law School estimates that the acquisition of a Brazil-
ian export license requires the performance of a total of 1,470 legal
actions by fourteen government agencies.81
In practice, the policies of various government agencies may re-
spond more to political influence than to the written law. Such uncer-
tainty with regard to actual policies led Rosenn to state that "knowing
the law is not nearly as important as knowing the policy of a given
regulatory agency, and more importantly, knowing how to convince
that agency to accord favorable treatment to your case." 2 He concluded
that the Brazilian regulatory style "grants untrammeled discretion to
the bureaucracy to do justice to one's friends and [to] apply the law to
one's enemies."a8
6. EFFECT OF THE NEW CONSTITUTION ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT
As it considers the proposed constitution, the Constituent Assem-
bly is actively debating the proper role of foreign capital in Brazil. Sev-
eral politicians of the majority party, Partido de Movimento da
Democracia Brasileira (PMDB), and parties of the left have argued in
favor of: (1) imposing greater restrictions on foreign banks," (2) creat-
ing more stringent limits on profit remittance 5 and (3) defining what
constitutes a national firm more narrowly so as to prevent many joint
ventures from gaining subsidized financing from the Brazilian Govern-
ment." On the other hand, President Sarney and other leading con-
81 Id.
88 Id. at 174. For example, in 1983, Rhodia Pharmaceuticals made a proposal to
Brazil's Council for Industrial Development (CDI) to expand production of aspirin by
four thousand tons a year. In September 1985, after Rhodia had invested over half of
the project's proposed $15 million cost, CDI cancelled Rhodia's authorization on the
grounds that the project was inconsistent with Brazilian industrial policy. CDI trans-
ferred the project to another firm, Nordeste-Carbornor, which firm proposed increasing
annual aspirin production by only two thousand tons with the help of subsidized fi-
nancing from a Brazilian Development Bank. Mudancas para Atrair Capital Externo
[Changes to Attract Foreign Capital], Estado do Sao Paulo, June 6, 1987, at 6, col. 1.
83 Rosenn, supra note 79, at 204.
84 See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
85 See supra notes 7, 60-62 and accompanying text.
86 See As Bases para uma Nova Ordem Econamica [The Basis for a New Eco-
nomic Order], Jornal da Tarde, June 12, 1987, at 13, col. 1 (reporting proposals to
define national firms as including only those companies with 100% Brazilian
ownership).
On the other hand, Severo Gomes of the majority party, Partido Movimento
Democratico Brasiliero [hereinafter PMDB], has proposed that national firm status be
given to any company headquartered in Brazil. He also believes that foreign banks
should not be allowed to offer accounts denominated in any currency other than that of
Brazil. Because Brazilian currency has been subject to high rates of inflation, this pro-
posal would severely hamper the operations of international banks such as Citibank.
Gomes supports limiting remittance of profits abroad and continuing official prefer-
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gressmen have asserted that, because foreign investment is essential to
Brazil's continued development, the country must undertake financial
deregulation and open its doors to foreign capital .1 Most observors
conclude that the final version of the constitution will leave the position
of foreign capital relatively unchanged."8
7. SUGGESTIONS FOR CHANGE
Current Brazilian law on foreign investment has the advantage of
allowing foreign capital to contribute to development while subjecting it
to sufficient regulation to make it politically palatable.8 9 Nonetheless,
in order for Brazil to participate fully in the modern international
economy, its foreign investment laws should be made more liberal in
substance and more predictable in application. The following proposals
are aimed at this goal:
(1) Equity investment should be encouraged by reducing legal ob-
stacles to debt conversion,9" to direct foreign investment in the stock
market91 and to repatriation of capital.2 The current debt crisis
presents Brazil with an unprecedented opportunity to encourage new
equity investment.
(2) Foreign investment should be indexed or monetarily corrected
according to the inflation rate of the currency in which the initial in-
ences for Brazilian firms in certain sectors of the economy. See Constituinte: 0 Debate
Sobre a Nova Ordem Econamica [Constitution: The Debate over a New Economic Or-
der], G.M., June 2, 1987, at 13, col. 1; Nationalizacao, Uma Ameaca Contra Bancos,
[Nationalization, A Threat to the Banks], G.M., May 13, 1987, at 6.
87 See Retirada Proibicao aos Bancos [Remove the Restriction on Banks], G.M.,
June 9, 1987, at 6 (reporting views of Congressman Jos6 Serra of the PMDB that
foreign capital should be granted liberal treatment).
President Jos6 Sarney himself has stated that "the profit remittance law will not
change; hence, Brazil will remain open, but some internal details will change." Safatlo,
Frota Admite Que Sarney Estt& Disposto a Assumir Negociacao da Divida [Frota
States That Sarney is Inclined to Resume Debt Negotiations], G.M., June 27, 1987, at
19. See supra note 61.
8 The author's interviews with Brazilian investors and lawyers confirm that, be-
cause the success of Brazil's economy depends on access to foreign capital, Brazil's laws
regulating foreign investment are unlikely to be substantially changed. Wlademir Lisso
Interview, supra note 56, Fabio Barbosa Interview, supra note 62; Jos6 Luis Inter-
view, supra note 56.
8" In particular, the mandatory registration of foreign investment allows the gov-
ernment to guard against remittance of excess profits and to exert some control over
Brazil's balance of payments. See, e.g., Law No. 4.131, art. 28 (Sept. 3, 1962) (empow-
ering Brazil's Office of Currency and Credit to restrict importation of foreign capital
and remittance of profits abroad when a deficit in Brazil's balance of payments exists
or is likely to arise).
"' See supra notes 16-37 and accompanying text.
9'1 See supra notes 38-53 and accompanying text.
92 See supra notes 54-59 and accompanying text.
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vestment was made. The increased value of the registered capital base
will reflect economic reality and avoid taxation of purely inflationary
gains.93
(3) The twelve-percent level above which the supplementary tax
applies should be raised for service-oriented firms which have relatively
low capital base requirements. The uniform level which is currently in
effect discriminates unfairly against service firms such as consulting
and engineering companies.9"
(4) Brazil should consider negotiating a tax treaty with the United
States which would reduce the withholding tax on United States enti-
ties investing in Brazil.
95
(5) Transfer of technology should be facilitated by allowing patent
royalties in excess of five percent to be remitted abroad and by calculat-
ing the percentage on gross rather than on net sales.9"
(6) Brazil should continue to encourage joint venture arrange-
ments, especially in technology areas where they are currently
restricted.
97
(7) The extreme nationalist measures proposed for the new consti-
tution, such as total domestic ownership of financial companies, should
be rejected.9" Instead, the restrictions prohibiting foreign banks from
operating in areas such as commercial lending should be lifted.99
"" See Rosenn, supra note 10, at 387; Stroeter, Trench & Veirano, supra note 62,
at 19.
:4 See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
' As of July 1987, Brazil had concluded tax treaties with 16 other nations, in-
cluding major exporters of capital and technology such as Japan and West Germany.
T. ARA6JO, supra note 8, at 81.
:1 See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
7 See supra notes 71-74 and accompanying text.
OS See supra notes 7, 84-88 and accompanying text.
9 See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
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